In this empirical paper, I use the 1996 wave of the ECHP dataset to investigate the relationship between measures of wage compression and training incidence in 11 European countries. I find that, after controlling for individual factors and country specific institutional differences, there is evidence of a positive and significant relationship between wage compression and training. This positive relationship is confirmed when I consider only general training. While the former finding is consistent with both competitive and non -competitive approaches to training, the latter result is only consistent with the non -competitive approach.
Introduction
Becker's theory of training predicts that, when labor markets are competitive, a compressed wage structure discourages investment in general skills. In this theory, workers pay for their general training, and a more compressed wage structure reduces the private incentives to undertake the investment. When training is …rm -speci…c, …rms and workers share the costs and the bene…ts of the investment. In this case, wage compression increases the …rm -sponsored component and reduces the worker -…nanced component of training. Overall, total investment in skills can increase or decrease.
When labor markets are not competitive, wage compression can encourage …rms to pay for general training (see , hereafter AP), and may increase the overall amount of investment in skills. According to AP, wage compression occurs when the (marginal) e¤ect of …rm -sponsored training on productivity exceeds the (marginal) e¤ect on the …rm's wage. By paying for training, the …rm can increase output more than wages. In these circumstances, training can be more pro…table than no training. The positive e¤ect of wage compression on training is clear when the training cost is entirely borne by the …rm. When the cost is shared by the …rm and the worker, the total investment in skills can increase or decrease 1 .
Wage compression can be generated by labor market institutions, including the minimum wage and wage bargains that involve unions.
Previous empirical research in the U.S. on the relationship between labor market institutions that a¤ect wage compression and training compares training incidence in states with di¤erent institutions (see AP [1999b] , Leighton and Mincer [1988] and Neumark and Wascher [2001] ) 2 . AP suggest that a complementary approach is to look at training incidence across countries with di¤erent wage structures. A prediction of the non -competitive theory of training is that company provided 1 AP stress this point as follows: "..It is important to emphasize, overall, that non -competitive theories do not predict that wage compression should necessarily increase training, but that this is a possibility." (p.16) 2 An interesting recent study by Peraita [2001] focuses on Spain.
2 formal training should be higher in countries with a more compressed wage structure. They notice, however, that the comparison of training levels across countries can be di¢cult because the data are collected using di¤erent methods, and the measured training levels are not easily comparable (AP [1999] ).
This di¢culty is partially removed in the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), a large household survey that covers most member countries in Europe. Rather than trying to harmonize output from national surveys, the European statistical agency (Eurostat) adopts an input oriented approach and uses the same "community" questionnaire as the base for the national versions of the survey. The data are collected by the National Collection Units and …nally checked by Eurostat (European Community [1999] ). A desirable feature of ECHP is that the de…nitions of and questions on training and earnings, the reference period and the survey methods are common across countries. This format increases comparability, but does not eliminate all problems, as the interpretation of common questions can vary across countries because of country -speci…c institutions and history (OECD [1991] ).
In this empirical paper, I use the 1996 wave of the ECHP dataset to investigate the relationship between measures of wage compression and training incidence in 11 European countries. To preview the main results, I …nd that, after controlling for individual factors and country speci…c observed and unobserved di¤erences, there is evidence of a positive and signi…cant relationship between wage compression and training. This positive relationship is con…rmed when I consider only general training. While the former …nding is consistent with both competitive and non -competitive approaches to training, the latter result is only consistent with the non -competitive approach.
The material included in the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the empirical strategy, Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 presents the results. Conclusions follow.
2 The empirical strategy
Comparative work on post-school training shows that the incidence of training varies considerably across developed countries (see Lynch [1994] ).
This variation is often explained by the presence of institutional factors. In some countries, the argument goes, there is a set of institutions, including the school system, local chambers of commerce, employer association and work councils that support a high training equilibrium (Soskice [1994] ). Labor market institutions that compress the wage structure and the expected returns to training can also a¤ect in a signi…cant way the training decision. Examples of these institutions are the minimum wage, labor unions, and the degree of centralization of the wage bargain.
The degree of wage compression varies signi…cantly across OECD countries (see OECD [1999] ). Given this variation, it is tempting to look at the correlation between country -speci…c measures of wage compression and training incidence. This approach, however, has two problems. First, there are many other country -speci…c di¤erences beside wage compression that can a¤ect training; second, the heterogeneity of individuals and jobs suggests that the relevant measure of wage compression
should not refer to the entire wage distribution in a country.
To illustrate the second point, consider the decision to invest in training by a 35 years old professional who is employed in the manufacturing sector. Conditional on productivity, the relevant measure of wage compression for this individual is earnings after training relative to earnings before training takes place. Assuming that individuals exploit the available information on current wages to infer future wages, a reasonably close proxy of the relevant measure of wage compression for this professional can be constructed by using the portion of the observed wage distribution that refers to employees in the same broad profession and sector and with at least 35 years of age. Since earnings vary with age, occupation and sector, the portion of the wage distribution associated to younger employees in completely di¤erent professions and sectors is unlikely to be informative.
De…ne C cjsa as the selected measure of wage compression in country c, occupation j , sector s and age group a. It is convenient to specify the empirical relationship linking individual training and wage compression as follows
where it is important to capture these e¤ects with the country dummies D c .
Clearly, these dummies pick up all the di¤erences in training outcomes associated to country e¤ects, which include average wage compression.
Conditional on these and other dummies, the coe¢cient ¾ in (1) Since the dependent variable is a dummy variable, I estimate a probit version of (1). Moreover, I take explicitly into account the fact that training T and wage compression C are measured at di¤erent levels of aggregation and I adjust the standard errors by allowing errors to be independent among clusters (country by occupation by sector by age group) and dependent within clusters.
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3 The data
The data on training incidence used in this paper are drawn from the 1996 wave of the European Community Household Panel. As pointed out in the introduction, the main advantage of these data is that the same "community" questionnaire is adopted by the national data collection units in each participating country, which increases comparability.
Each wave includes a household and a personal …le, and the same house- In this paper I consider only male employees aged between 16 and 55 in 1995 who are employed in manufacturing, building and private services, and I avoid endogeneity issues by computing the measures of wage compression D91, D95 and D51 from the 1994 wave, at the price of excluding individuals from Austria and Finland, who are interviewed only in 1996. Table 1 shows both training incidence in 1995, de…ned as the percentage of employees in the sample who have undertaken vocational education or training in the reference period, and the average measures of wage compression by country. Table 1 here
Training incidence is highest in Denmark, the UK and Germany and lowest in Portugal, Greece and Italy. The evidence in the table is broadly consistent with the comparative evidence provided by the OECD and drawn from national surveys, which shows that training incidence in (West) Germany and the UK is higher than in France and Spain (OECD [1991] ).
Turning to the measures of wage compression, one well known source of these measures is the OECD [1999] , which computes these di¤erentials at the country level for the early 1990. There are several problems with this source for the purposes of this paper: …rst, information on Spain, Greece and Ireland is missing; second, information on Germany is limited to the previous West Germany; last but not least, the OECD indicators are developed using heterogenous national sources. I overcome these problems by using the 1994 wave of ECHP. My de…nition of earnings is net annual wages and salaries of individuals with paid employment and working full -time between 30 and 70 hours per week 6 . It turns out that wage dispersion at the country level, measured by D91, is highest in Portugal, Germany (inclusive of the previous East Germany), the UK and Ireland, and lowest in Spain, Italy and the Netherlands.
Visual inspection of the table does not show a clear relationship between country -speci…c training incidence and wage compression. The discussion in the previous section suggests that country speci…c measures 6 With the exception of France, where earnings are gross of taxes. 7 of wage compression are less informative for the purpose at hand than measures that apply to portions of the wage distributions. Therefore, I construct measures of wage compression that vary by country, occupation, sector and age group. In order to avoid having too few observations in each portion of the wage distribution, I divide occupations into managers, technicians and professionals on the one hand and clerks and blue collars on the other hand; I also divide sectors into manufacturing and building and private services. Finally, I retain the entire age spectrum for individuals in the age group 16-35 and only the wage distribution of those aged more than 35 for the age group 36-55. The reason for this choice is that the portion of the wage distribution that refers to employees aged 16 to 35 is not relevant as a proxy of individual wage compression for employees aged more than 35. Table 2 shows the average values of D91, D95 and D51 for the two occupational groups, the two sectors and the two age groups. Wage dispersion, measured by D91, is higher among managers and professionals than among clerks and blue collars and in the manufacturing and building sector than in the private services sector. Quite naturally, given that earnings pro…les are concave, junior workers face higher dispersion than senior workers. Table 2 here
The Empirical Evidence
The empirical analysis consists of estimating the following probit model (2) where I use the logarithm of C as a measure of wage compression, individual age A in place of age dummies, a detailed set of 8 occupations as occupational dummies and a set of 12 sectors as sectorial dummies. The vector X includes the following variables: two education dummies, one for attained tertiary education (College) and the other for attained upper secondary education (High Sch); experience, measured as age minus age at labor market entry (Exp); marital status (M arried); and long term unemployment (U l = 1: presence of at least one unemployment spell longer than one year in the …ve years before 1995, 0 otherwise).
Average age and experience in the sample are 36.62 and 18.67 years respectively. The percentages of employees with college education and a high school degree are 0.175 and 0.393; close to 62% of the employees are married and 8.9% have experienced at least one spell of long term unemployment. Table 3 presents the main …ndings of the paper. I use two de…nitions of training. In the former de…nition, the dependent variable T is equal to one in the event of training, both general and …rm -speci…c, and to zero in the event of no training (column 1). In the second de…nition, T is equal to one in the event of general training and to zero in the event of no training (column 2). In both columns I use the log of D91 as the measure of wage compression. In the remaining two columns of the table I use the log of D95 and D51 as alternative measures. Notice …rst that country speci…c di¤erences, that include labor market and other important institutions, are captured by the inclusion of countryspeci…c dummies (not shown in the table). These dummies are always jointly di¤erent from zero. Table 3 here I …nd that training incidence is higher among college graduates, as expected. I also …nd that training is lower among the more experienced and those who are married. Importantly, the experience of a spell of long term unemployment in the …ve years before the survey reduces the probability of training. This result con…rms that long term unemployment has a scarring e¤ect. The e¤ect, however, is small: the discrete change in the probability of training associated to the experience of a long term unemployment spell is ¡0:037 in the case of all training events and ¡0:019 in the case of general training 7 . 7 This change is computed as the probability of training when ul = 1 minus the 9
The key result in the table is that there is evidence of a positive and signi…cant relationship between the selected measures of wage compression and training incidence. Based upon these estimates, I calculate that a one percent increase in wage compression increases the probability of training by 0:038 when all training events are considered and by 0:022 in the case of general training One problem with the probit regressions is that they either treat …rm -speci…c and general training as one category or ignore …rm -speci…c training. I check the robustness of the results in Table 3 by allowing the dependent variable T to assume three separate values, 0 in the case of no training, 1 in the case of …rm -speci…c training and 2 in the case of general training. Since these categories are not clearly ordered, I estimate a probability of training when ul = 0 , by keeping the other independent variables are at their sample mean values.
8 Letting P rob(T = 1) = ©(x 0¯)
, this marginal change is computed using the following formula
Peraita [2001] …nds a similar distribution of training by income in Spain.
multinomial logit regression, using no training as the baseline category. Each estimated coe¢cient reported in Table 4 can be interpreted as the proportional change in the odds ratio when the associated independent variable changes marginally. Table 4 here
The results in the table con…rm the …ndings in Table 3 and show that a marginal increase in wage compression leads to a signi…cant increase in the log odds ratio of both …rm -speci…c and general training with respect to no training. The fact that this marginal e¤ect is higher in the case of general training than in the case of …rm -speci…c training is consistent with the view that, while the costs and bene…ts of …rm -speci…c training are shared by the parties, the employer bears the costs of general training.
I conclude that the positive relationship between wage compression and training incidence is not limited to the broader de…nition of training, that includes both …rm -speci…c and general training, but holds also in the case of general training. While the evidence concerning …rm speci…c training is consistent with both competitive and non -competitive theories of training, the evidence about general training is only consistent with the non -competitive approach.
Conclusions
In this empirical paper, I have used the 1996 wave of the ECHP dataset to investigate the relationship between measures of wage compression and training incidence in 11 European countries. I have accounted for the cross -country variation in training incidence with country -speci…c dummies, that capture country speci…c observed and unobserved e¤ects, including the wide array of institutions which a¤ect the decision to invest in skill. Conditional on these e¤ects, I have identi…ed the empirical relationship between wage compression and training by exploiting the within -country variation in wage compression, that I allow to vary within each country by occupation, sector and age group.
I have found evidence of a positive and signi…cant relationship between wage compression and training, both general and …rm -speci…c. This positive relationship is con…rmed when I consider only general training. While the former …nding is consistent with both competitive and non -competitive approaches to training, the latter result is only consistent with the non -competitive approach. ------------------------------------------------------------- 
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